During Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s recent official visit to Jakarta on 23 May, he met with his Indonesian counterpart, Joko Widodo where a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) was signed. The two-day trip was aimed at strengthening economic relations and included the signing of 11 documents and memorandums of understandings (MoUs).
The development has been hailed as a significant step for Southeast Asia’s largest economy in its efforts to accelerate post-pandemic recovery. By diversifying export options, Indonesia aims to strengthen its economic resilience.
Additionally, this initiative offers an opportunity for Iran to enhance its energy cooperation, especially considering the economic challenges it has faced due to ongoing economic warfare by the US since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
Crucially, given Indonesia’s strategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, there is potential for the transportation of Iranian oil to China. Although the most significant takeaway of the visit were reports that both countries will ditch the dollar in their bilateral trade, instead using their local currencies, which serves as a testament to the rapidly evolving multipolar era characterized by increased South-South cooperation and de-dollarization.
At a press conference, Raisi was quoted as saying that “sanctions and threats have not been able to stop Iran in any way” as it continues to develop ties with “friendly countries.” He also added that Tehran was “prioritizing” relations with Muslim-majority countries, highlighting mutual interests with Jakarta such as “a shared commitment to back the rights of Palestinians until the liberation of the sacred al-Quds.”
Despite wishful, speculative reports that the Indonesian government is contemplating normalization with the Zionist apartheid state, Jakarta has a decades-long policy against recognizing the entity’s legitimacy.
In fact such a move would be against the country’s Constitution, whose Preamble stipulates that Indonesia believes that “freedom is the right of every nation” and opposes “colonialism in this world.” This has consistently applied to the Palestinian issue.
This stance was most recently exemplified in late March, when the governing body of football, FIFA stripped Indonesia of hosting rights to stage the Under-20 World Cup, over its opposition to Israel’s participation. As a result, the tournament was relocated to an alternative host nation, Argentina, where it is currently underway.
Beyond the realm of geopolitics, this visit also holds the potential for profound theopolitical implications, particularly regarding the reduction of sectarianism in Indonesia, with a specific focus on the Shia minority due to projection of the Islamic Republic’s soft power in the region.
President Raisi and the high-level Iranian delegation that accompanied him on the visit, participated in unified congregational prayers at Jakarta’s Istiqlal Mosque, in a display of solidarity between Sunni and Shia Muslims at Southeast Asia’s largest mosque.
The statesman also held a meeting with Muslim clerics and heads of various Islamic organizations, where according to Mehr News Agency, he emphasized the readiness of the Islamic Republic of Iran “to cooperate with Indonesian Islamic organizations with the aim of simultaneously raising the level of cultural and economic interactions with the country.”
Emphasizing the theopolitical aspect of the visit, Raisi said during the meeting:
“The greatest asset of the people of Indonesia is faith in God and devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt (AS) and from this point of view Iran’s relationship with Indonesia is not only a political and economic diplomatic relationship, but a deep and solid relationship that is rooted in the beliefs of the two nations and will not be shaken by anything.”
Further illustrating Tehran’s influence in the socio-religious sphere, Raisi received a positive and warm welcome by Indonesian Shias at the Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) in Jakarta. The Iranian-funded institution has once been described as a “lifeline” to the Shia community in the overwhelmingly Sunni-majority country, which is also currently, the world’s most populous Muslim nation. The complex also includes the “Husainiyah Al-Huda” – where prayers and important religious events are commemorated, especially during the mourning month of Muharram.
Addressing those in attendance at the ICC, President Raisi, in addition to stressing the importance of Islamic unity, explained that, “The purpose of my trip is to develop political, economic, commercial, cultural and civilizational relations between Iran and Indonesia.”
Although Shias in Indonesia only account for around 1 percent of the country’s 230 million Muslim population, the Shia are said to have existed in Indonesia since Islam first entered the archipelago, however “Culturally, Shia has emerged in Indonesia along with the arrival of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago through trade and da’wah in its taqiyyah form.” In the modern era, though, it was the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that arguably helped propagate the Shia school of thought to greater heights in the country and beyond.
Unfortunately, over the decades, and due to spread of Wahhabism in the region, in addition to the sectarian implications of conflicts in West Asia post-2000s, Shia-phobia is also prevalent, despite the relatively low number and low profile of the Shia community in Indonesia. It isn’t too uncommon for example to see negative attitudes against the “Syiah” online for example.
Indeed, such anti-Shia sentiments are said to have peaked during the administration of Widodo’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), particularly between 2006 and 2013. The most notorious incident took place on 26 August 2012, when hundreds of Shias were driven out of their small village in Sampang on the island of Madura, East Java. There had been previous incidents of intimidation, but in this case a mob of local Sunnis, spurred on by hate preachers, burnt down several homes. The sectarian attack left one community member dead and a few injured, causing the Shia community to become internally displaced.
Some 335 of the residents were moved to a new location in government-provided housing, and in 2020 most are said to have renounced their Shia faith and converted to Sunnism in order to be allowed to return, though there are reports that those who did so, including the community leader still feel marginalized in the village. A first wave of repatriation was carried out in April 2023 and the second wave, earlier this month on 5 May. According to BBC News Indonesia, “It is estimated that there are still four families who adhere to Shia in the Sidoarjo refugee camp.”
Nevertheless, in spite of the intolerance towards Indonesia’s Shia community and the wider “deterioration” of democracy under President Widodo, his presidency has also promoted religious pluralism and tolerance. A study last year by the Singapore-based Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS), found that under Widodo, religious minorities like Shias “enjoyed a relatively better environment in practising their faiths,” and that Shias “have suffered less harassment and intimidation from the Sunni majority than under previous governments.”
Raisi’s visit to Indonesia certainly underscores the Widodo administration’s commitment to fostering intrafaith tolerance in the country and coupled with the Iranian president’s message of Islamic unity, against the backdrop of closer economic ties between the two countries, it is hoped that such positive diplomatic developments have a ripple effect, not in wider Indonesian society, but also in neighbouring Malaysia, where Shia Islam remains essentially outlawed.
By showcasing Indonesia’s acceptance and respect for the Shia minority, Raisi’s visit could serve as a catalyst for change when it comes to intrafaith tolerance in Southeast Asia. The Jakarta trip thus holds not just geopolitical, and geoeconomic significance, but also theopolitical importance too all of which will have far-reaching strategic implications, especially for the Islamic Republic.
Editor’s note: An interesting piece of history is that during World War 2 when Southeast Asia was fighting for independence against their various European colonial occupiers, one resistance group in Indonesia that fought against Dutch rule was named Hizbullah. Fast forward to the 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran helps to support the newly founded Hizbullah of Lebanon in order to fight against the Zionist invasion and occupation.
